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Religious Freedom in Canada
A Crucible for Constitutionalism
by Benjamin L. Berger*

This article examines three axes around which contemporary Canadian debates on freedom of religion are turning: the status and protection of group and collective religious
interests; the emergence – and instability – of state neutrality as the governing ideal in
the management of religious difference; and the treatment of Indigenous religion. Each
is discussed as a key thematic and doctrinal development emerging from recent activity
in the freedom of religion jurisprudence in Canada. Each is also an instance, the article
suggests, of religion doing its particularly effective work of exposing the fundamental
tensions and dynamics in Canadian constitutionalism more generally.
Keywords: religious freedom, Canada, collective, neutrality, Indigenous peoples

Summary: 1. Introduction. – 2. Key Developments in Religious Freedom in Canada. – 2.1. Individualism and the Re-emergence of the Collective. – 2.2. The Rise – and Instability – of State Neutrality.
– 2.3. Indigenous Peoples, Religion, and Sovereignty. – 3. Conclusion.

1. Introduction
To reflect on the status, treatment, and role of religion has always been
an avenue into understanding the deeper tensions, ideologies, and politics
at work in the Canadian state, and the history, logic, and politics of its
constitutional order. Religion was imbricated in the origins of the country
in a way that means that Canadian constitutionalism has never embraced
the strict separationist or non-establishment tradition of its neighbor
to the south. Canada’s earliest constitutional documents, including the
Treaty of Paris (France, Britain, and Spain, 10 February 1763) and the
Quebec Act, 1774 ((UK), 14 Geo III, c 83) acknowledged the political
and practical realities of British rule over a substantial French Catholic
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population with specific protections and rights extended to Roman
Catholics and the Roman Catholic Church in Canada (Berger 2015; Epp
Buckingham 2014). These protections would find expression in the form
of denominational education rights in Canada’s first written constitution,
the British North America Act, 1867 (UK, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3), rights that
persist to this day. The formative relationship between French and English
communities was refracted through their constitutive religious identities
and interests, and the legacy of those origins is a political and legal space
in Canada that resists easy claims about an «Atlantic Divide» (Whitman
2008) in approaches to the separation of church and state.
There have, of course, been profound constitutional and societal
changes since these early days in the history of the country. Over this
period of Canadian history there has been a diminishment in the overt
role of religion in the structures of state authority. Nowhere is this more
evident than in Quebec, where the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s has led
to a fundamental repositioning of the Catholic Church in the province’s
politics and culture. Today, Canadian political and legal space is also
famously characterized by profound religious and cultural diversity that
has been met with a stance of official multiculturalism that counsels toleration and accommodation as the appropriate posture towards religious
difference (Jedwab 2003; Kymlicka 2003). And with the introduction of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, the frame of constitutional
regard for individual and community rights and interests in Canada was
radically expanded. Religion and religious freedom would now be but
one constitutionally recognized interest amongst many.
Yet a central role for religion in Canadian constitutionalism persists.
After early years under the Charter in which the jurisprudence under
section 2(a) – the right to freedom of conscience and religion – was formative but relatively sparse, the last 10-15 years have seen an explosion
of freedom of religion cases. Canadian religious freedom jurisprudence
has shifted and evolved in response, with the Supreme Court of Canada
seeking to navigate many of the core problematics that bedevil the adjudication of religious freedom wherever it takes place. One purpose of this
brief article is to canvass some of the key developments and debates that
have emerged from this frenetic activity in freedom of religion in Canada.
But there is another story told here: what we see when we look at
these developments is that in Canada, as elsewhere in the world, freedom
of religion is still serving as a singularly valuable site for the disclosure
of the deeper challenges, politics, and paradoxes of constitutionalism at
large. Freedom of religion turns out to be a crucible for constitutionalism
more generally. The themes that are discussed in the following sections
are, thus, not only key axes in the doctrinal and jurisprudential debate
around freedom of religion in Canada; they are also instances of religion
doing its peculiarly effective work of drawing our attention to the tensions
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that affect and afflict contemporary Canadian constitutional law more
generally (for more extensive treatment of this idea see Berger 2017).
2. Key Developments in Religious Freedom in Canada
2.1. Individualism and the Re-emergence of the Collective
One such fundamental tension is the dynamic between the individual
and the group. The tendency of liberal constitutionalism is to «pixelate»
human experience, focusing on the individual as the primary unit of
constitutional regard and analysis. This tendency has shaped Canadian
freedom of religion jurisprudence and the effects on the area have been
the subject of substantial scholarly and jurisprudential critique (Kislowicz
2013; Muñiz-Fraticelli 2014; Berger 2015; Newman 2016). But in recent
years the Supreme Court has made tentative moves to open more space
for the collective and group interests involved in religious freedom; we
have witnessed something of a re-emergence of the collective.
To be sure, notes of regard for the collective dimensions of religious
life have long been present in Canadian thinking about freedom of religion. Pre-Charter jurisprudence referred to religious liberty as «at once
the necessary attributes and modes of self-expression of human beings
and the primary conditions of their community life within a legal order»
(Saumur v City of Quebec, [1953] 2 SCR 299 at 329), and, as discussed
above, there are group protections for religion in the form of certain education rights for denominational schooling. But in the post-Charter section
2(a) jurisprudence, the overwhelming tendency has been to prioritize the
individual and his or her personal religious freedom, rather than – and
sometimes at the expense of – understanding religion as inherently tied
to communities and collectivities.
The path was laid out in the touchstone post-Charter case on section
2(a), R v Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 SCR 295, in which Justice Dickson
explained that «[w]ith the Charter, it [had] become the right of every
Canadian to work out for himself or herself what his or her religious
obligations, if any, should be» (351). But the individualist rendering of
religious freedom was doctrinally solidified in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47, in which the Court adopted its subjective sincerity
test for section 2(a). Focusing on religion as being, in essence, «about freely and deeply held personal convictions or beliefs» (para 39), the Court
held that to gain access to the protection of section 2(a), a claimant need
only «demonstrate that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief
that has a nexus with religion» (para 65). The practice or belief need not
accord with the dogma or positions of religious officials or communities;
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if this subjective sincerity exists, section 2(a) protects against non-trivial
interferences with those practices and beliefs.
A series of cases bear the imprint of this atomism, but the high-water
mark came with the Court’s decision in Alberta v Hutterian Brethren of
Wilson Colony, 2009 SCC 37, in which a small Hutterite community
objected that the requirement for a photograph on their drivers’ licenses
unjustifiably offended their right to religious freedom. Though she accepted that religion has a «collective aspect», Chief Justice McLachlin
explained that the «broader impact of the photo requirement on the
Wilson Colony community» did not «transform the essential claim […]
into an assertion of a group right» (para 31). Despite a forceful dissent
that would have laid substantial weight on the collective dimensions of
the claim, in the majority’s hands the group religious interests at play in
the case became simply «costs» associated with the limitation on the right,
to be weighed against the benefits of the universal photo requirement to
society at large (Berger 2010; Moon 2010; Weinrib 2011).
The solicitousness for the individual’s beliefs and choices that we
have seen in the Charter protection of religion is to be expected: liberal
constitutionalism sees the individual far more clearly than it does the
group, treating the individual as the primary unit of constitutional analysis
(Berger 2015, 66-78; Bakan 1997). But an insistent individualism in the
legal understanding of religion effaces significant dimensions of religion
as experienced and lived outside the courtroom. Religion troubles the
law’s individualism; phenomenologically, much of what gets categorized
as religion has an irrepressibly collective dimension and is anchored in the
lives of communities. Even when framed by a priority on the individual,
religion cannot really be analyzed or understood without regard for the
communities in which it is lived and that sustain it over time.
And so a case would eventually emerge in the section 2(a) jurisprudence in which the Court would seek to find space for constitutional
regard for the collective dimensions of religion. The central question
in Loyola High School v Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 12, was
how the provincially mandated «ethics and religious culture» program
applied in the context of a private Catholic high school. The program
prescribed a curriculum that exposed students to the beliefs and ethics
of different world religions and required that the instruction on these
topics be conducted from a «neutral and objective perspective». Loyola
objected that requiring a Catholic school to teach about Catholicism
and the ethics of other traditions in a «neutral way» impaired religious
freedom. In finding that Loyola could not be compelled by the state
to teach about Catholicism in particular ways, Justice Abella, writing
for the majority, explained that «[r]eligious freedom under the Charter
must […] account for the socially embedded nature of religious belief,
and the deep linkages between this belief and its manifestation through
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communal institutions and traditions» (para 60). She acknowledged that
«these collective aspects of religious freedom – in this case, the collective
manifestation and transmission of Catholic beliefs through a private denominational school – [were] a crucial part of Loyola’s claim» (para 61).
Loyola is the strongest statement from the Court recognizing the
collective and group aspects of religious freedom1. And yet there remains substantial uncertainty about what the nature and scope of this
recognition and what it will mean for religious freedom claims on the
part of groups and institutions (Chan 2017). How truly independent of
the Charter’s traditional focus on the individual is the protection of these
«collective aspects»? Justice Abella’s account of the collective aspects of
religion is that they are «manifestations» of individual religious belief and
she frames the liberty interests involved as those of the «members of the
community», not the group itself. The collective dimension is indexed
to the individual: she explains the need to give weight to the collective
on the grounds that «individuals may sometimes require a legal entity in
order to give effect to the constitutionally protected communal aspects
of their religious beliefs and practices» (para 33). And how robust is this
regard for the collective? Diagnostically, the key test will come when the
collective religious interests are at odds with the individual’s religious
freedom.
We are in an interesting moment in the development of Canadian
religious freedom jurisprudence, wrestling with and wondering what
it means to give regard to the collective, communal, and institutional
aspects of religious freedom. And we watch as other countries explore
the implications of the granting of collective and corporate religious
rights2 – a so-called «corporate turn» in religious freedom jurisprudence
(Schwartzman, Flanders, and Robinson 2016, xiii). Some have found it
useful to think about the individual, private, and choice-based understanding of religion evidenced in religious freedom jurisprudence as a
«protestant» approach to the kind of religion that attracts constitutional
protection (Berger 2015, 100–101; Sullivan 2005, 7–8). If that is an edifying framing, one wonders whether the renaissance of the group marks
a tentative «catholic turn» in religious freedom in Canada.

Indeed, the minority decision in Loyola would have gone even further, holding
that religious organizations themselves could enjoy religious freedom under section 2(a).
2
See, e.g., the US experience discussed in Hosanna-Tabor v EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012); Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
1
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2.2. The Rise – and Instability – of State Neutrality
Recent years have seen an intriguing shift in the concepts that anchor
the Canadian approach to religious freedom: the ascendancy of a governing principle of state neutrality, arguably dethroning notions of toleration
(Berger 2014). The seeds of this ideal of state neutrality in Canada were
planted in the Court’s first discussion of section 2(a) in Big M, but the
first two decades of freedom of religion jurisprudence tended to focus
heavily on notions of toleration as grounding the constitutional posture
towards religion. This development in fact tracks a transnational phenomenon in freedom of religion: across varied legal orders, the concept
of state neutrality has settled in as the regulative ideal in the constitutional
management of religion3. But – in Canada, as elsewhere – as the legal emphasis on state neutrality emerges, so too does an increased awareness of
its instability and, with this, of the deeper problematics that characterize
the interaction of religious difference and the liberal constitutional state.
The case that most clearly and forcefully announced the ascendancy
of this principle of state neutrality was Mouvement laïque québécois v
Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16. In Saguenay, an organization seeking the
«complete secularization of the state in Quebec» (para 9) challenged a
local practice of opening municipal council meetings with a discernibly
Christian prayer. The Court found that the practice breached the state’s
duty of neutrality in religious matters, which, though not explicitly imposed by the Charter, «has become a necessary consequence of enshrining
the freedom of conscience and religion» (para 76). Justice Gascon explained that «the state is required to act in a manner that is respectful of
every person’s freedom of conscience and religion» and that the «corollary
is that the state must remain neutral in matters involving this freedom»
(para 1). The Court described this duty of state neutrality as requiring
«that the state neither favour nor hinder any particular belief, and the
same holds true for non-belief […]. It requires that the state abstain from
taking any position and thus avoid adhering to a particular belief» (para
72). Because the prayer in question «resulted in a distinction, exclusion
and preference based on religion» (para 120), it breached the duty of
state neutrality.
The appeal of a duty or principle of state neutrality as the governing
ideal for the management of religious difference is clear: «It rhetorically
positions law outside the ‘us’ and ‘them’ of political conflict; it casts law
in the role of disinterested conciliator rather than boundary-setter; and
its invocation relieves the legal system of the burden of its own cultural
and historical contingency» (Berger 2014, 119). Of course, the duty
3
See, e.g. Leyla Sahin v Turkey ECHR 2005-XI 819, 44 EHRR 5; Lautsi and Others
v Italy ECHR 2011-III 2412, 54 EHRR 3; Dahlab v Switzerland ECHR 2001-V 449.
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of state neutrality reflects some important principles and aspirations
regarding even-handedness and equality as between individuals and
groups irrespective of religious belief (Ryder 2005; Moon 2014, 19-24).
Yet the ambition for depoliticization through adherence to this standard
of state neutrality – that it will extract law from history and politics in
matters of religion – is consistently and necessarily frustrated, collapsing
in ways that gesture evocatively to the character of the constitutional
project more generally.
Cases about prayer and historical symbols show one way in which
this frustration occurs. The political institutions and constitutions of
the modern state are thick with the deposits of their religious histories.
However, in Saguenay, Justice Gascon made clear that «the state’s duty
of neutrality does not require it to abstain from celebrating and preserving its religious heritage» (para 116). Translating these artefacts of the
state’s relationship with particular religions into matters of heritage and
culture legally insulates them from the demands of state neutrality, but
their presence and preservation is a reminder that the liberal state and its
constitution are more religiously particular and historically conditioned
than the language of «state neutrality» seeks to communicate.
But a clear-eyed reflection on the character of religion itself unsettles
and frustrates the ideal of state neutrality in matters of religion in a more
foundational way. For all its virtues, the cogency of a duty of state neutrality floats on a naïve confidence in the divisibility of «matters involving»
religion and those of a civic nature (Berger and Moon 2016, 6). However,
no such neat distinction can be drawn. If one understands religion as
a normative and cultural system that produces claims about ethics, has
implications for conduct, and advances a vision of a good society, religion
will have much to say about matters of broad public policy import. The
state’s inescapable adoption of positions on such matters will thus involve
position-taking on matters of deep religious interest. We have seen this
in Canada as it relates to questions of abortion, same-sex marriage, medically-assisted dying, and civic education to name just a few, matters on
which the necessity of adopting a constitutional position is experienced
by some communities as position-taking on matters of religion. This is
not the result of not yet getting the approach to and definition of state
neutrality «right». It is a reflection of the reality that state neutrality,
understood as abstention on position-taking, is dependent on a legal
view of the nature of religion that fails; and in failing, it consigns the
legal demand for state neutrality to inconsistency and paradox. Faced
with this, the Court has conceded what it must: that «the state always has
a legitimate interest in promoting and protecting» values like equality,
human rights and democracy (Loyola, para 47). But each of these values
and controversies is a ground for interpretation, debate, and contestation
about which religion might have much to say. Whatever state neutrality
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may mean, it does not mean that the state must be neutral about the
nature of a good society.
What begins, then, as troubling the ideal of state neutrality as an
adequate response to the deeper dynamics involved in the relationship
between law and religion becomes a way into something of broader,
more general, constitutional import. The conundrums of pursuing state
neutrality in matters of religion end up disclosing the particular and
normative character of liberal constitutionalism and the state that it constitutes. The protection of freedom of religion becomes an important site
of reflection for the larger critical enterprise of challenging the conceit
of law’s neutrality and autonomy from culture. Religion is not alone in
being able to show this truth – from their own distinctive perspective,
scholars of Indigenous law and Aboriginal justice have pointed to this
fact about the Canadian constitutional project (Borrows 2016, 2010; Asch
2014; Boisselle 2010) – but it is a resource well fitted to exposing ways
in which, as Charles Taylor put it years ago, «liberalism is also a fighting
creed» (Taylor 1995, 249).
2.3. Indigenous Peoples, Religion, and Sovereignty
Perhaps the most intriguing and challenging recent development in
the Canadian conversation surrounding religious freedom has been the
opening up of the question of how general principles of religious freedom
under the Charter interact with the particularities surrounding Indigenous
rights, Indigenous religion, and the fundamental constitutional problem
of unsettled sovereignty in Canada.
The defining issue of the political and legal moment in Canada is that
of «reconciliation» between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples.
Although questions of Indigenous rights, treaties, and sovereignty had
long been before the Court and were an important dimension of Canadian
politics for some time, the conversation around Indigenous justice issues
sharpened and intensified significantly following the report of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (Truth and Reconciliation
Canada 2015). The Commission’s work, and the report that it issued,
marked an historic reckoning not only with the dark history of the use of
residential schools in an effort to extinguish Indigenous culture (Miller
1996), but also with the broader injustices and effects of colonialism in
Canada. This history and its ongoing effects are the subject of increasing understanding and study amongst scholars of Indigenous law and
politics in Canada (Macklem and Sanderson 2016; Borrows and Coyle
2017), but are rarely analyzed as a meaningful part of the story of religious difference and religious freedom in Canada (see Epp Buckingham
2014; Moon 2014).
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And yet religion was central in shaping the foundational relationship
between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples. The early colonial
project was one in which religious missionaries played a crucial role,
sometimes extending state power and sometimes aligning with Indigenous
communities in advocating for the recognition of Aboriginal rights and
sovereignty (Foster and Berger 2008). With the expansion westward of
the Canadian state and its claims for sovereignty, the Federal government
banned Indigenous religious rituals and practices, such as the potlatch,
as part of its effort to consolidate political and economic control over
Indigenous people and their territories. There is a dialectic here between
denials of religion and denials of sovereignty, and thus between denials of
religious freedom and aspirations to turn a desire for colonial sovereignty
into political and constitutional fact. And one sees these links between the
suppression and use of religion and the striving for political sovereignty
very clearly, though tragically, in the history of the residential school system in Canada. In a devastating project aimed at cultural extinguishment,
the Canadian state worked with the churches in administering this system.
Indigenous communities are still, inspirationally, overcoming its ruinous
effects, which continue to condition the political and legal relationship
between the Canadian state and Indigenous peoples. The story of religion,
state, and Indigenous people must be excavated and studied as a central
part of the distinctive history – the «emotional inheritances», in Asad’s
felicitous phrase (Asad 2003, 102) – of law and religion in Canada.
There is a robust constitutional jurisprudence in Canada dealing
with Aboriginal and treaty rights that has arisen through section 35 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, by which Aboriginal and treaty rights are
«recognized and affirmed». That jurisprudence has, with a few notable
exceptions, been disappointing for Indigenous peoples, largely because
of the formidable evidentiary and legal burdens that s 35 has imposed
on claimants. Given those burdens, the history that I outlined above,
and the close tethering between Indigenous religion and the land, it was
perhaps unsurprising that a case would emerge that, instead, involved a
claim for the protection of Indigenous rights and land interests through
the general guarantee of freedom of religion pursuant to section 2(a) of
the Charter.
That case was Ktunaxa Nation v British Columbia (Forests, Lands
and Natural Resource Operations), 2017 SCC 54. The Ktunaxa asserted
that the government’s approval of a large resort development project in a
region of British Columbia called the Jumbo Valley or, for the Ktunaxa,
Qat’muk, offended their religious freedom. The Ktunaxa believe that
the valley is the home of the Grizzly Bear Spirit, a figure of spiritual
significance, and that the construction of permanent accommodations
would drive the Grizzly Bear Spirit from Qat’muk. Proceeding with the
development would, thus, «irrevocably impair their religious beliefs and
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practices» (para 6). The Court euphemistically characterizes this as «a
novel claim» (para 70). It was, in fact, a claim with radically subversive
potential. Given the connection between Indigenous religion and the
land (Borrows 2010), and the capacious scope of section 2(a) to that
point, this claim had profoundly disruptive potential for the Crown use
and control of land and its resources. Wrestling with that potential led
the Court to novel – and troubling – doctrinal outcomes.
The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the Ktunaxa’s
claim. Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice Rowe, writing for the majority
of the Court, concluded that the Ktunaxa’s claim simply fell outside the
scope of freedom of religion because they were seeking to protect not
their beliefs and practices, but rather the Grizzly Bear Spirit itself. The
majority explains that «the Charter protects the freedom to worship,
but does not protect the spiritual focal point of worship» (para 71).
Although infringements of religious freedom can be (and, in the Court’s
jurisprudence, most commonly are) justified as reasonable limitations
under section 1 of the Charter, this holding in Ktunaxa represented the
first clearly articulated internal scope limitation for freedom of religion
in Canada.
But this particular scope limitation feels uncomfortably specific to
Indigenous religion. For other religious traditions with which the Court
is accustomed in its freedom of religion jurisprudence it is hard to
imagine the government being able to adversely affect the metaphysical
referent of their beliefs and practices (ie, God, for Jews and Christians,
for example). By contrast, the «spiritual focal point of worship» for the
Ktunaxa is vulnerable to state interference: the Grizzly Bear Spirit is tied
to the land. Justice Moldaver, in separate reasons, rightly points to this
distinguishing feature, explaining that «[f]or Indigenous religions, state
action that impacts land can therefore sever the connection to the divine,
rendering beliefs and practices devoid of their spiritual significance» (para
127). For the Ktunaxa, Moldaver J explains, the protection of religious
practices without regard to the metaphysics that lend those practices
their meaning «amounts to protecting empty gestures and hollow rituals,
rather than guarding against state conduct that interferes with ‘profoundly
personal beliefs’, the true purpose of s. 2(a)’s protection» (para 130). The
majority’s approach, therefore, «risks foreclosing the protections of s. 2(a)
of the Charter to substantial elements of Indigenous religious traditions»
(para 131). The majority’s approach seems to exile important dimensions
of Indigenous religion outside the shelter of freedom of religion.
And yet, whereas the distinctive and unruly features of this Indigenous
claim under s. 2(a) led the majority to say something novel and troubling
about the scope of the right, Justice Moldaver’s ultimate position says
something equally arresting about the reasonable limitation of religious
freedom. Although he found that the impugned state action would render
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the Ktunaxa’s beliefs «entirely devoid of religious significance» and their
prayers, ceremonies, and rituals would «become nothing more than empty
words and hollow gestures» (para 133), Justice Moldaver nevertheless
justified the government’s decision as «reasonable in the circumstances»
(para 155). This result would seem no less troubling to the Ktunaxa,
given the broad justificatory scope that it grants to the state: actions that
could entirely evacuate the right to freedom of religion for the Ktunaxa
are nevertheless judged reasonable.
What was it about this novel claim for the protection of Indigenous
religion that yielded these uncomfortable conclusions from both the
majority and minority? Justice Moldaver’s reasons suggest an answer,
exposing the extent to which questions of sovereignty suffused the analysis
of this freedom of religion claim in Ktunaxa. To accede to the Ktunaxa’s
claim would allow them «to veto development over the land» and «would
effectively transfer the public’s control of the use of over fifty square kilometres of land to the Ktunaxa» (para 150). Justice Moldaver explains:
«This placed the Minister in a difficult, if not impossible, position. He
determined that if he granted the power of exclusion to the Ktunaxa,
this would significantly hamper, if not prevent, him from fulfilling his
statutory objectives: to administer Crown land and to dispose of it in the
public interest» (para 150).
The pivotal phrase here is «Crown land». Is Qat’muk Crown land to
be disposed of in the public interest? That question – the status of the
land and the sovereignty claim over it – is the irreducible political core
of such disputes between the state and Indigenous peoples. Although
this core is somewhat less obvious in the majority’s decision, the way
those reasons efface the link between land and religion suggests similar
concerns and preoccupations. A tantalizing tell comes in the majority’s
initial description of the facts. The majority explains that the area in
dispute «is located in a Canadian valley in the northwestern part of the
larger Ktunaxa territory» (para 3). Is it a «Canadian valley» or is it part
of «Ktunaxa territory»? The shearing forces within this facially anodyne
statement are the forces exerted by the underlying sovereignty claims
working themselves out – seeking and resisting reconciliation – beneath
and through the debate about freedom of religion. Imaginatively, both
decisions begin from an assertion of state sovereignty over the land; they
proceed from, are shaped by, and ultimately return to that imaginative
foundation.
With this, we may detect some resonance between this developing
issue of the treatment of Indigenous religion and the institutional or corporate turn in religious freedom jurisprudence discussed earlier in this
paper. There is an intrinsic claim about sovereignty at work in both cases,
and freedom of religion seems to offer itself as something of a natural or
hospitable vehicle for such claims. As against dominant contemporary
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understandings of religious freedom that treat its essence as a matter of
liberty and equality, there is another story about religious freedom that is
about jurisdictional and political pluralism (Muñiz-Fraticelli 2014; Cohen
2017). Read against the backdrop of this story, the Ktuanxa decision is a
provocative development in Canadian freedom of religion debates for two
reasons: it marks out the issue of Indigenous religion and reconciliation
as an important matter to track in the coming years, and it gestures more
broadly to the role that religious freedom plays – perhaps genetically – in
questioning and testing state sovereignty.
3. Conclusion
This article has examined three axes around which contemporary
Canadian debates on freedom of religion are turning: the status and protection of group and collective religious interests; the emergence – and
instability – of state neutrality as the governing ideal in the management
of religious difference; and the treatment of Indigenous religions. There
are others, to be sure, but these three represent not only key developments in this recently active field of freedom of religion in Canada, but
also vectors of change (with all of the uncertainty and open questions that
this involves) as we look ahead in the unfolding of jurisprudential and
scholarly debates. But at the same time that each says something important
about the evolution of freedom of religion in Canada, each also gestures to
underlying currents and tensions in Canadian constitutionalism at large.
The question of how to give regard to the collective and associational dimensions of social life within a constitutional logic focused on liberty and
autonomy is a structural problem in liberal constitutionalism. The issue
of state neutrality and its limits is one that touches on the fundamental
question of the legitimacy and authority of constitutions. And studying
the treatment of Indigenous religions reminds of the abiding uncertainty
and contestation that surrounds sovereignty in Canada. In each instance,
freedom of religion is serving as a window into the issues and dynamics
that affect and afflict contemporary Canadian constitutional law at large.
What is it about the constitutional protection of freedom of religion
that gives it this diagnostic function? The distinctive ability of religious
freedom to reveal general trends and patterns in contemporary Canadian constitutionalism is not just a matter of a surge in cases on point or,
in any straightforward way, a function of increased religious pluralism.
The answer is more structural and intrinsic to the relationship of law
and religion.
In its effort to judge claims of freedom of religion, the law must adopt
a particular vision of religion and its relationship to the political – an approach to and conception of its subject that will make religion digestible
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within the constitutional order (Berger 2015). And yet religion as experienced and lived by individuals and communities will always overflow
the constitutional categories and assumptions used to attempt to manage
it legally. Religion is never just what law imagines it to be, or wishes it
were. In terms offered by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, «lived religion» will
always elude and exceed «governed religion» (2015). In resisting those
categories, assumptions, and commitments drawn from the logic of Canadian constitutionalism, it makes them visible. The unruliness of religion
within the conceits of liberal constitutionalism generates conceptual and
doctrinal friction. And through this friction, religion displays the tensions,
paradoxes, and instabilities that bedevil those conceits.
Benjamin L. Berger
Osgoode Hall Law School
York University, Canada
bberger@osgoode.yorku.ca
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